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NOTES AND COMMENT
THE WASHINGTON STATUTE ON NUNCUPATVE WILLS.-In the
old days of our common law, when the art of writing was limited
to but a comparative few, the idea of a nuncupative or oral will
gained a fairly firm footing. But with the spread of the ability to
write, such wills came to be looked upon with disfavor owing to the
opportunities presented for fraud and perjury Hence as early as the
reign of Henry VIII. important restrictions were imposed on the
right and power to make a nuncupative will. Contemporary legal
writers expressed the idea that such a will could be made only when
the testator was seriously ill, fearing impending death and uncertain
that he would live long enough to make a written will. 1

The early case of Coles v. Mordaunt 2 in which an attempt was
made to set up a fraudulent nuncupative will, by the most outrageous perjury, undoubtedly led to the stringent provisions in the
Statute of Frauds (29 Charles II.) with respect to nuncupative
wills. This act provided that no nuncupative will should be good
where the estate bequeathed exceeded in value the sum of thirty
pounds, unless it was proven by the oath of three witnesses who were
present at the time of making and that the testator at the time of
pronouncing the same did bid the persons present, or some of them, to
bear witness to the fact that such was his will, nor unless such will
was made in the last sickness of the deceased, in his dwelling-house,
or where he had been resident for ten days or more, next before the
making of such will, except where he was surprised or taken sick
away from home and died before he returned. Soldiers and sailors
in the service, however, were specifically exempted by the statute
from its operations.
The restrictions thus placed on the execution of oral wills have
never been removed and in many jurisdictions more have been added.
Particularly have there been restrictions placed upon the amount of
property which may be bequeathed by such wills. The policy of the
law has been to discourage such testamentary dispositions. Hence
it is surprising to find that Washington gives the right to bequeath
an unlimited amount of personalty, as long as the prescribed formaliities have been complied with. The statute reads as follows: "No
nuncupative will shall be good when the estate bequeathed exceeds
the value of two hundred dollars ($200) unless the same be proved
by two witnesses who were present at the making thereof, and it be
proven that the testator, at the time of pronouncing the same, did
bid some person present to bear witness that such was his will, or
to that effect, and such nuncupative will was made at the time of the
last sickness. Nothing herein contained shall prevent any mariner
at sea or soldier in the military service from disposing of his wages
1 Swinburne, pt. 4, sec. 29, p. 350; Perkensi see 476.
2 4 Ves. 196.
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or other personal property by nuncupative will.
be devised by a nuncupative will." 3

No real estate shall

The history of the Washington statute may explain this. Many of
our fundamental ideas of law were, naturally enough, derived from
the systems of law under which the early settlers of this part of the
country had lived before coming here. Most of these pioneers emigrated from the Middle West and especially from Iowa. The, Iowa
statute on nuncupative wills provided then, 4 as it does now, 5 that
personal property of the value only of three hundred dollars might be
bequeathed by an oral will, but if the bequest were of a greater
value, it should be valid only to that extent. Thus, an early statute
of Oregon territory 6 provided that "No nuncupative will shall be
good when the estate bequeathed exceeds the value of two hundred
dollars, nor unless the same be proven," following the language of
the Statute of Frauds.
In 1854, after Washington became a territory, the section of the
Oregon statute relating to nuncupative wills was adopted verbatim
by the territorial legislature. 7 The statute remained in that form
until 1873, when the Probate Practice Act was passed. 8 In this
enactment, the word "nor" which had preceded the phrase "unless
the same be proven," etc., was omitted, and subsequent "nor's" were
changed to "and's," so that the statute in its new form provided that
"no nuncupative will shall be good when the estate bequeathed exceeds in value the sum of Two Hundred Dollars, unless the same
be proved," etc. The statute remained practically unchanged in form
until 1917, when the Legislature added the provision that real estate is not devisable by nuncupative will, 9 following the rule laid
down in Irwin v. Rogers. 10
Thus it is observed that under the statute as it now stands, there is
no limit -to the amount of personalty that may be bequeathed by a
nuncupative will. The change as made in the statute of 1873 is so
3 Rem. Comp. Stat. 1406, Pierce's Code, 1923, see 10023, L '17, p.
651, sec 36.
4 Code, '51 sec 12S0.
5 Code, 1924 sec. 11850.
6 Gen'l Ls. of Ore., 1853, sec. 23, Chap. on Wills.
7 L. '54, p. 315, sec 23.
8 L. '73, Probate Practice Act, Chap. III, sec. 33, (p. 259)
9 Rem, Comp. Stat. 1406, Pierce's Code, 1923, sec. 10023, L. '17,
p. 651, sec. 36.
10 91 Wash. 284, 157 Pac. 690, L. R. A. 1916 E. 1130.
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radical in this respect that one is disposed to doubt that the change
was intentional and to believe that it was due rather to an error
in drafting the statute. It was dearly a change in the wrong direction, in that it was directly against the tendency of the law, which
is to discourage nuncupative wills as much as possible, (aside from
those of soldiers in the service and mariners at sea). If the policy of
the law, statutory and otherwise, is to increase the safeguards surrounding the testamentary disposition of property, it is difficult to
understand the removal of one of the most reliable assurances against
fraud and perjury, i. e., the requirement that a will shall be in
writing.
A statutory limitation on the amount which can be given by a verbal will would not necessarily be harsh or unjust in its operation. If a
man of considerable means has so long-delayed the making of a will
that it is necessary for him to pronounce it orally a short time before
his death, the requirements of justice would in the most of such cases
be better satisfied by allowing such an individual to die intestate, his
property to be distributed according to the statutes of descent and
distribution, in which is set out what the law considers to be the
ideal way for a man to distribute his property
On the other hand, the present statute, so very liberal with respect
to nuncupative wills, has a direct tendency to remove the bulwarks
of safety which the law has so carefully erected to protect testamentary dispositions of property.
Perhaps it will not be until a case arises in which an attempt will
be made to establish a nuncupative will bequeathing a large amount
of property, that the courts and the legislature will determine that
the statute, in this respect at least, is basically unsound. The Washington statute, insofar as it fails to limit the amount which a properly
executed nuncupative will may bequeath, is identical with the statute
of 29 Charles II. A statute such as that, designed to meet the necessities of medieval society, has no place today in the law, when the
necessity for it has ceased to exist. To the extent that it allows bequests by soldiers and mariners and bequests of trivial sums by other
individuals, it is justified, but in other cases there is no good reason
why the ordinary requirements of our statutes on Wills should
not apply.
Edward Starin.

